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ABSTRACT
Background
The purpose of our study was to evaluate the effects of a new reimbursement rule for
antihypertensive medication that made thiazides mandatory first-line drugs for newly treated,
uncomplicated hypertension. The objective of the new regulation was to reduce drug
expenditures.
Methods and Findings
We conducted an interrupted time-series analysis on prescribing data before and after the
new reimbursement rule for antihypertensive medication was put into effect. All patients
started on antihypertensive medication in 61 general practices in Norway were included in the
analysis. The new rule was put forward by the Ministry of Health and was approved by
parliament. Adherence to the rule was monitored only minimally, and there were no penalties
for non-adherence. Our primary outcome was the proportion of thiazide prescriptions among
all prescriptions made for persons started on antihypertensive medication. Secondary
outcomes included the proportion of patients who, within 4 mo, reached recommended
blood-pressure goals and the proportion of patients who, within 4 mo, were not started on a
second antihypertensive drug. We also compared drug costs before and after the intervention.
During the baseline period, 10% of patients started on antihypertensive medication were given
a thiazide prescription. This proportion rose steadily during the transition period, after which it
remained stable at 25%. For other outcomes, no statistically significant differences were
demonstrated. Achievement of treatment goals was slightly higher (56.6% versus 58.4%) after
the new rule was introduced, and the prescribing of a second drug was slightly lower (24.0%
versus 21.8%). Drug costs were reduced by an estimated Norwegian kroner 4.8 million (E0.58
million, US$0.72 million) in the first year, which is equivalent to Norwegian kroner 1.06 per
inhabitant (E0.13, US$0.16).
Conclusions
Prescribing of thiazides in Norway for uncomplicated hypertension more than doubled after
a reimbursement rule requiring the use of thiazides as the first-choice therapy was put into
effect. However, the resulting savings on drug expenditures were modest. There were no
significant changes in the achievement of treatment goals or in the prescribing of a second
antihypertensive drug.
The Editors’ Summary of this article follows the references.
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Antihypertensive medication is one of the major drug
expenditures for the national drug-reimbursement scheme in
Norway, adding up to around Norwegian kroner (NOK) 1,500
million per year (E180 million, US$220 million) [1], i.e.,
NOK330 per inhabitant (E40, US$49). This represents 10% of
all registered drug sales. The use of antihypertensive drugs
has been increasing steadily over many years. However, their
proportional contribution to the overall drug expenditure in
Norway has decreased slightly (Table 1). An estimated 6%–
10% of the Norwegian population is being treated for
hypertension [2].
Several drugs are available for the treatment of hyper-
tension and, in terms of effectiveness, there is little or no
difference between them. From a public health and economic
perspective, the major difference between the drugs is
probably the price. The cost of many non-thiazide drugs is
10-fold that of thiazides [2].
Norway is one country where the use of thiazides is
particularly low and the use of expensive alternatives is high
[2], and this has been an issue of concern for the Ministry of
Health as well as for Norwegian parliamentarians [3].
In late 2003, the Norwegian parliament passed a regulation
aimed at reducing public expenditure on antihypertensive
drugs. Choosing a thiazide as the ﬁrst-choice therapy for
uncomplicated hypertension became a prerequisite for the
reimbursement of drug costs, unless there were medical
reasons for selecting other drugs. The new reimbursement
rule was ofﬁcially presented on 15 January 2004 and was put
into effect on 1 March 2004.
Substantial savings were expected to result from the new
reimbursement rule. However, factors other than the
anticipated increase in thiazide use may affect expenditures.
For instance, some critics believe that thiazides are less
effective in controlling blood pressure and that the need for
add-on drugs will outweigh the economic gains.
The effects of health-policy interventions are often poorly
evaluated. Owing to pressures to implement health-policy
interventions quickly and widely, it is not always feasible to
conduct rigorous evaluations, such as a randomised con-
trolled trial. Sometimes the nature of the intervention is such
that a control group is difﬁcult to establish, e.g., owing to
mass-media campaigns.
If a randomised evaluation is not possible, a before-and-
after study may be an alternative. However, if measurements
are only made once before and once after the intervention,
the ﬁndings may be misleading. For instance, if changes in
prescribing of a drug were observed before and after an
intervention, this could simply reﬂect an ongoing trend that
is independent of the intervention. Another explanation for
an observed change could be other inﬂuences that coincide
with the intervention. One way of increasing the robustness
of a before-and-after analysis is to collect several data points
before and after the intervention—an interrupted time-series
(ITS) analysis (see Figure 1) [4].
The primary objectives of this study were to measure
changes in prescribing of thiazides for newly treated,
uncomplicated hypertension following the introduction of
the new reimbursement rule. Also, we explored possible
changes in proportions of people achieving recommended
blood-pressure targets and the need for add-on drugs or
switching of medication.
Methods
We conducted an ITS analysis, with 11 measurements at
monthly intervals before and after the intervention. We
incorporated a transition period from December 2003 to
February 2004. The study protocol (Text S1) is available on
our Web site (http://www.nokc.no).
Participants
We included general practices in and around Oslo, Norway.
The sample was drawn from three different practice
populations: (1) practices randomised to the intervention
group in a recently completed trial of a multifaceted
intervention aimed at improving adherence to clinical
practice guidelines for the pharmacological treatment of
hypertension, where prescribing of thiazides was an outcome
measure [5]; (2) practices from the control group in the same
trial; and (3) practices that had not participated in the trial.
Intervention
A new rule from the Norwegian Medicines Agency made
thiazides the only reimbursed drug class for uncomplicated
hypertension, i.e., in patients who had no hypertensive organ
damage, and no gout, reduced glucose tolerance, or untreated
diabetes. Non-thiazide drugs may be reimbursed provided
that a medical reason is given in the medical record.
Information about the new rule was circulated to all
physicians through the January 2004 edition of the bulletin of
Table 1. Sales of Antihypertensive Drugs in Norway 1993–2003
Sales Year
1993 1998 2003
Sales of antihypertensive drugs (DDD/1,000 inhabitants/day)
a 104.6 165.3 229.6
Estimated retail costs of antihypertensive medication (2003, NOK [million])
b 1,038 1,325 1,500
Total estimated retail costs of registered drugs (2003, NOK [million])
b 7,680 10,822 14,378
Retail costs of antihypertensive medication as a proportion of the cost of
all registered drugs
14% 12% 10%
Antihypertensive drugs are also prescribed for conditions other than hypertension, e.g., ACE inhibitors for heart failure and beta-blocking agents for coronary heart disease.
aThe DDD is the assumed average maintenance dose per day for a drug used on its main indication in adults [1].
bSales figures for 1993 and 1998 are expressed as 2003 NOK based on Norwegian Consumer Price Indices [9].
doi:10.1371/journal.pmed.0040232.t001
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debated in the media [7].
No speciﬁc sanctions were announced, but it was stated
that the National Insurance Administration, which manages
the reimbursement of drugs, was about to increase its
monitoring activities of adherence to reimbursement rules,
generally. In theory, a physician who does not adhere to the
reimbursement rule may lose the right to issue prescriptions
that are to be covered by the national insurance scheme.
However, this has never happened in practice. During the
ﬁrst year after introduction of the new rule, there was a
minimal amount of monitoring.
The intervention was not completely independent of other
changes that have taken place over time. A debate on the
choice of medication for hypertension has been going on for
several years within the medical community, and also in the
public domain. For instance, an economic analysis on
potential savings if thiazides were used as the ﬁrst-line
medication [2] made the headlines in Norway in September
2003 [8]. Also, the new regulation prompted a debate, widely
covered in the media, where opinion leaders and other
stakeholders had strongly divergent views regarding the use
of thiazides for the treatment of hypertension [7]. This may
be regarded as a direct consequence of the intervention and
not a source of bias. The 3-mo transition period incorporated
in our analysis eliminates any short-term effects of this
debate on our results. However, it is not possible to
determine what, if any, effect the debate had on raising
awareness of the policy and, thereby, adherence.
Data Collection
We collected data from electronic medical records held at
the practices involved in the study. The data included all
prescribed antihypertensive drugs (Anatomic Therapeutic
Chemical [ATC] groups C02, C03A, C03E, C07, C08, and C09)
from 3 y before and 1 y after the reimbursement rule was
implemented.
For all patients who had been given a prescription for an
antihypertensive drug, we also collected information on
cardiovascular diagnoses (International Classiﬁcation of
Primary Care [ICPC] codes K74–80, K84, K89–92, and K99)
and prescribing of cardiovascular drugs (ATC group C01).
This was to identify patients who might have been taking the
drugs for reasons other than hypertension. We also extracted
blood-pressure measurements, and only patients with a
recorded measurement above 140/90 mm Hg were included
in the main analyses.
Because antihypertensive drugs are also prescribed to treat
migraine or hyperthyroidism, we identiﬁed patients with
these diagnoses (ICPC codes N89 and T85) and prescriptions
for drugs to treat these conditions (ATC codes N02C and
H03B). If these diagnoses or prescriptions were recorded, the
patient was excluded from the analysis.
The new reimbursement rule included only patients
treated for uncomplicated hypertension, deﬁned in this case
as not having target-organ damage, gout, decreased glucose
tolerance, or untreated diabetes. In order to identify patients
with these conditions, we extracted information on relevant
diagnoses (K87, T92, T89, and T90) and prescriptions (M04
and A10). We did not attempt to identify patients with
decreased glucose tolerance, as we did not believe that the
available data would enable us to do this in a reliable way.
Patients with a recorded glucose measurement of 7 mmol/l
and no recorded prescriptions for antidiabetic medication or
other diabetes aids were considered as having untreated
diabetes, and were thus excluded from the main analyses.
We have no reason to believe that the intervention affected
data collection, which was the same for all included data.
Outcomes
In the protocol, we deﬁned outcomes in terms of undesired
events (e.g., the proportion of non-thiazide prescribing). We
decided to invert the outcomes and to report desired events
instead, in the belief that this is easier to understand. We also
initially planned in the protocol to report two indicators of
inappropriate prescribing as one composite outcome meas-
ure. However, we subsequently decided to report them
separately as we believed that mixing the two measures could
be confusing for the reader, particularly since many patients
had both outcomes.
The primary outcome was the proportion of thiazide
prescriptions among all prescriptions made for persons
started on antihypertensive medication. Drugs belonging to
ATC groups C03A and C03E were counted as thiazides.
Patients were considered untreated if there was no record of
a prescription for an antihypertensive drug in the previous 22
mo.
Secondary outcomes could be classiﬁed into ﬁve groups: (1)
subgroup analysis of primary outcome where all patients with
diabetes were excluded (patients with untreated diabetes
were excluded from the main analysis); (2) the proportion of
patients who, within 4 mo, reached recommended blood-
pressure goals; (3) the proportion of patients who, within 4
mo, were not started on a second antihypertensive drug; (4)
the proportion of patients with heart failure being prescribed
an angiotensin-converting enzyme (ACE) inhibitor (ATC
groups C09A and C09B) within 3 mo of receiving the
diagnosis; and (5) the proportion of patients with coronary
heart disease being prescribed a beta-blocking agent (ATC
Figure 1. An ITS is a Quasi-Experimental Design that Can Be Used to
Evaluate an Intervention when a True Randomised Controlled Experi-
ment Is Not Feasible
In this study, the intervention was a policy change that was being
delivered to all physicians in Norway and, because of this, no control was
available. An ITS design strengthens a before-and-after design by taking
repeated measurements of the outcome over time, both pre- and post-
intervention. Using appropriate statistical methods, it is then possible to
estimate the effect of an intervention given the underlying trend of the
data, and taking into account effects such as seasonality or serial
correlation. There are a variety of possible intervention effects in an ITS
experiment, for example where the intervention has had an effect on the
slope and level of the outcome.
doi:10.1371/journal.pmed.0040232.g001
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measures for inappropriate prescribing).
For the secondary outcomes, the intervention period was
shortened to 8 mo to allow for sufﬁcient follow-up for all
included patients.
We also conducted a subgroup analysis, comparing the
main outcome for the three groups of practices that
participated in the study.
These are objective outcomes based on data extracted
electronically from medical records that required little or no
interpretation; no blinding or reliability testing of outcome
evaluation was therefore considered necessary.
Economic Evaluation
We conducted a post-hoc estimation of the savings on drug
expenditures from the perspective of the health system, i.e.,
those who pay for health care. In Norway, antihypertensive
medication is largely paid for by the government. We
estimated the savings by extrapolating the drug expenditures
in the pre-intervention and the post-intervention periods to
include all practices in Norway for a full year. For each
antihypertensive prescription for someone started on anti-
hypertensive medication during the pre-intervention period,
we applied drug prices as of 15 November 2003 from the 2004
edition of the Norwegian Pharmaceutical Product Compen-
dium (‘‘Felleskatalogen’’) and, for the post-intervention
period, we applied prices from the 2005 edition (prices as of
1 December 2004). Thus, the economic evaluation was a
simple before-and-after analysis, not an ITS analysis. We
excluded value-added tax and adjusted for the general price
increase from 2003 to 2004 using consumer price indices from
Statistics Norway [9]. All ﬁgures are expressed in 2004 NOK.
Ethics
We asked for consent from all the participating practices
(Text S2). Physicians and patients were not identiﬁable from
the collected data. No ethical approval was needed. The
Norwegian Social Science Data Services approved the
handling of data.
Sample Size and Statistics
In the planning of a previous randomised trial [5], we had
estimated a needed sample size of around 140 practices in
order to demonstrate a 25% relative reduction in outcome
measures between the control and intervention groups, with
a power of 80% and a statistical signiﬁcance level of 5%. This
was based on the assumption that none of the outcomes of
interest would be less than 50% in the control group, that the
average number of patients included per practice would be
around ten patients per outcome measure, and that the
intracluster correlation coefﬁcient would be around 0.2. In
the current study, the recruited practices would serve as their
own control, and we knew that the baseline level of
prescribing non-thiazides greatly exceeded 50%. Thus,
assuming no serial correlation or trend over time, we
estimated a need for less than half the sample size compared
with the previous study, i.e., around 60 practices.
Data were analysed using generalised estimating equations
(GEE) in Stata (version 9.2) using the xtgee procedure and
logit link function, adjusting for clustering and potential
serial correlation at the practice level. Data were too sparse to
account for clustering and serial correlation at the physician
level. An exchangeable correlation structure was used.
Parameters and effect sizes are either presented as odds
ratios with 95% conﬁdence intervals (CIs) or are converted to
percentages with 95% CIs for ease of interpretation. All
outcomes were re-analysed, removing the transition phase to
corroborate the results of the primary analyses.
Results
We invited 106 practices to participate, of which 64 agreed
and provided us with written consent. Three practices were
excluded owing to technical difﬁculties, and thus our analyses
are based on data from 61 practices. Among these, 19
practices were from the intervention group in a trial that we
had recently conducted [5], 21 practices were from the
control group in the same trial, and 21 practices had not
participated in the trial. The number of patients started on
antihypertensive medication was similar in the two time
periods (1,628 patients before and 1,580 patients after the
rule was introduced). The aggregated results for before and
after the intervention, as well as during the transition period,
are shown in Table 2.
During the baseline period, the proportion of thiazide
Table 2. Main Findings, Aggregated per Time Period
Outcome Time Period Absolute Difference
(95% CI)
a
Pre-intervention Transition Post-intervention
Proportion of patients receiving thiazides 164/1,628 (10.1%) 77/484 (15.9%) 393/1,580 (24.9%) 16.6% (12.7% to 20.1%)
Proportion of patients receiving thiazides
(excluding all patients with diabetes)
155/1,496 (10.4%) 76/442 (17.2%) 377/1,434 (26.3%) 18.5% (12.7% to 20.1%)
Proportion of patients achieving treatment goal 727/1,284 (56.6%) 229/384 (59.9%) 523/895 (58.4%) 0.5% (21.4% to 10.1%)
Proportion of patients being prescribed a second drug 390/1,628 (24.0%) 116/368 (24.0%) 255/916 (21.8%) 4.7% (20.6% to 6.6%)
Proportion of patients with heart failure receiving
ACE inhibitor
45/294 (15.3%) Not applicable
b 32/280 (11.4%) 3.8% (7.9% to 2.0%)
Proportion of patients with coronary heart disease
receiving beta-blocker
175/508 (34.4%) Not applicable
b 199/555 (35.9%) 1.1% (4.3% to 7.3%)
aAbsolute difference and CIs are derived from the statistical models. For each outcome, the absolute difference presented is the difference between the predicted first point of the post-
intervention phase minus the predicted last point of the pre-intervention phase.
bFor these outcomes, we used date of diagnosis as the time point in the analysis, and a prescription had to be made within 3 mo after this date to be counted as compliant. Because the
transition period lasted only 3 mo, we considered it appropriate to disregard it for these outcomes.
doi:10.1371/journal.pmed.0040232.t002
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started on treatment for uncomplicated hypertension was
consistently around 10% (Figure 2). In the transition period,
i.e., the 3 mo before the regulation went into effect, thiazide
prescribing increased considerably and, after the new
regulation was made operational, the proportions averaged
around 25%. The new level of thiazide prescribing remained
stable within the time frame of our study (Figure 2).
The results of the regression analysis for the main outcome
are shown in Table 3. The regression coefﬁcients can be
interpreted as follows. During the baseline period, thiazide
prescribing was decreasing by a statistically non-signiﬁcant
absolute rate of 0.3% per month (95% CI 0.2% to 0.8%).
After the transition period, thiazide prescribing was nearly
constant, decreasing by a statistically non-signiﬁcant absolute
rate of 0.05% per month (95% CI 0.65% to 0.35%). During
the transition phase, the proportion of newly diagnosed
patients who were prescribed thiazides increased by 4.9% per
month (95% CI 0.3% to 9.1%). This corresponds to a 15%
increase during the 3-mo transition phase. An alternative
analysis excluding the transition phase conﬁrms this. The
odds ratio measuring the change in level from baseline to
post-intervention is 3.7 (95% CI 2.5 to 5.6); using the
predicted value for month 11, this can be interpreted as a
change in level from baseline to post-intervention of 16.5%
(95% CI 9.9% to 24.8%).
The results were similar when all patients with diabetes
were excluded from the analysis (Table 2).
The regulation did not appear to have an effect on the
achievement of treatment goals or the need for adding or
switching to other drug classes, with no statistically signiﬁcant
change over time (Figures 3 and 4). Also, for the use of ACE
inhibitors for heart failure and the use of beta-blockers for
coronary heart disease, we did not detect any statistically
signiﬁcant change (Table 2). However, the sample sizes for
those analyses were much smaller.
In the baseline period, the practices from the intervention
group in the recently conducted trial were prescribing
thiazides more frequently than the other two groups
(absolute difference 12.3%; 95% CI 8.6% to 22.2%). This is
in agreement with the results of the randomised trial [5]. As
shown in Figure 5, the absolute increase in thiazide
prescribing was also less pronounced in these practices
compared to the ones that had not received the trial
intervention. However, the difference was not statistically
signiﬁcant (absolute difference in intervention group practi-
ces 6.9%; 95% CI 6.0% to 15.7%).
We estimated drug expenditures during the pre-interven-
tion period to be NOK3.7 million (E0.44 million, US$0.55
million). We estimated drug expenditures for the post-
intervention period, after adjusting for differences in
prescribing volumes, to be NOK3.5 million (E0.42 million,
US$0.52 million). By extrapolating these ﬁgures to the
national level, we estimated savings on drug expenditures to
be NOK4.8 million (E0.58 million, US$0.72 million) over the
ﬁrst 12 mo post-intervention, which is equivalent to NOK1.06
per inhabitant (E0.13, US$0.16).
Discussion
After the regulation was introduced making thiazides the
only drugs qualifying for reimbursement for newly diagnosed
uncomplicated hypertension, the rate of thiazide prescribing
for this patient group increased from 10% to 25% in the
practices included in our study. There was no apparent
negative effect from the regulation in terms of achievement
of treatment goals, the need for adding or switching to
another drug class, or on the use of ACE inhibitors for heart
failure or beta-blockers for coronary heart disease.
Strengths and Weaknesses of the Study
The inherent weaknesses of an observational design make it
difﬁcult to establish a causal relationship between the
intervention and the observed effects. However, the magni-
tude of change, the temporal relationship with the inter-
vention, and the plausibility of a causal relationship make us
conﬁdent that it exists.
We do not know how representative the study practices are
of general practices in Norway. Almost 40% of the invited
practices did not agree to participate in our study, and this
may have introduced some degree of bias. It is also possible
that the new rule had a different impact on physicians in and
around Oslo than in the rest of the country. However, total
sales of thiazides increased all over the country during the
study period, although this increase is less in Oslo than in the
Figure 2. Proportion of Thiazide Prescriptions among All Prescriptions
for Patients Started on Treatment for Uncomplicated Hypertension
doi:10.1371/journal.pmed.0040232.g002
Table 3. Regression Analysis for Main Outcome (Prescribing of
Thiazides)
Section of Time Series Odds Ratio CI (95%) p-Value
Pre-intervention slope 0.969 0.922 to 1.019 0.220
Change in level from
pre-intervention to
transition phase
1.358 0.775 to 2.379 0.285
Transition slope 1.46 1.076 to 1.98 0.015
Change in level from transition
phase to post-intervention
1.295 0.875 to 1.917 0.195
Post-intervention slope 0.996 0.962 to 1.031 0.823
doi:10.1371/journal.pmed.0040232.t003
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underestimated the effect size.
The price of many hypertensive drugs changed consider-
ably in the year following the new regulation. While the
increase in sales volume (deﬁned daily dosages [DDDs]) for
antihypertensive medications continued from 2003 to 2004,
the total costs fell [1]. This was likely a result of speciﬁc
measures unrelated to the new regulation, such as the
‘‘graded price model,’’ which ensures an automatic price
reduction when a drug goes off patent [1]. For example, the
price of many ACE inhibitors dropped substantially during
the study period. However, it is also possible that the
introduction of mandatory thiazide prescribing contributed
to minor changes in drug prices, for instance the price
increase that we observed for some thiazide preparations.
The decrease in the price of non-thiazides, paralleled by an
increase in thiazide prices, diluted savings associated with the
regulation. We also conducted our economic analysis using
2003 prices for both study periods, and found that the
estimated savings would have been approximately doubled
without the observed price changes.
The bulk of savings resulting from the regulation can be
expected over the following years, as an increasing number of
patients will be started on thiazides. Assuming that prescrib-
ing patterns and drug prices remain unchanged from the
post-intervention period and onwards, we estimate that the
annual savings would be approximately NOK37 million, (E4.4
million, US$5.5 million) after 5 y, which is equivalent to
NOK8.12 per inhabitant (E0.97, US$1.21) (discounting rate of
4%, in accordance with guidelines from the Norwegian
Ministry of Finance). However, countermeasures by pharma-
ceutical companies can be anticipated and could inﬂuence
prescribing patterns and drug costs, thus reducing the
potential savings.
One-third of the included practices had a higher level of
thiazide prescribing at baseline, reﬂecting their participation
in a randomised trial of an intervention promoting the use of
thiazides [5]. This may have led to a slight underestimation of
the intervention effect. However, the estimated effect did not
change signiﬁcantly after exclusion of these practices from
the analysis (an absolute increase from 15% to 17%).
In our opinion, the a priori speciﬁcation of the transition
period confers an advantage in our study. The estimated
effect size of the intervention depends much on the choice of
transition period. Without incorporating a transition period,
the observed increase in thiazide prescribing over the ﬁnal
months before the new rule came into operation would have
been included in the baseline period, making the effect size
appear smaller. Conversely, if we had decided to extend the
transition period by 1–2 mo in each direction, the difference
before and after would have appeared to be greater than what
we reported. This illustrates the potential for manipulation of
time-series data and the need for detailed and publicly
available protocols.
Study Findings in Relation to the Overall Evidence
Earlier attempts at achieving changes in prescribing
patterns have often been aimed at inﬂuencing professional
behaviour, rather than imposing a change in behaviour.
Various quality-improvement strategies have been employed,
e.g., educational interventions, reminders, audit and feed-
back, or ﬁnancial incentives. In a recent systematic review of
randomised and non-randomised studies, the authors con-
cluded that such strategies only lead to modest shifts in the
prescribing patterns of antihypertensive medication (median
absolute increase of 3%, interquartile range 1% to 5.5%) [10].
We recently conducted a randomised trial in Norwegian
general practice evaluating the effect of a multifaceted
intervention, including educational visits, audit and feedback,
and computerised reminders [5]. The intervention led to an
absolute increase in the rate of thiazide prescribing of 10%,
which we considered a substantial effect compared to other
interventions. However, the costs of implementing the
intervention were also high, and the estimated savings were
modest [11].
Our ﬁndings indicate that regulatory measures can be
more effective in achieving changes in prescribing than
conventional quality-improvement strategies. In addition,
implementing a regulation such as the thiazide rule, with
little monitoring and negligible penalties, makes it a far more
Figure 3. Proportion of Patients Achieving Treatment Goals (140/90
mm Hg) within 4 mo, among All Started on Treatment for Uncomplicated
Hypertension
doi:10.1371/journal.pmed.0040232.g003
Figure 4. Proportion of Patients Receiving a Second Antihypertensive
Drug within 4 mo of Starting Treatment for Uncomplicated Hypertension
doi:10.1371/journal.pmed.0040232.g004
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physician behaviour is that it may be seen as infringing upon
physician autonomy. The Norwegian Medical Association did
not oppose the introduction of the new rule, but many
critical voices were raised from the medical community, for
example 19 consultants and professors at a university hospital
in Oslo sent a letter of protest to the Minister of Health [12].
Other physicians argued that the medical profession has an
ethical obligation to avoid unnecessary spending in order to
make best use of the limited resources allocated to the health
services.
The observed increase in the rate of thiazide prescribing
was substantial in both absolute and relative terms (15% and
150%, respectively). On the other hand, even after the new
regulation was introduced, non-thiazide drugs were being
prescribed in 75% of all new cases of uncomplicated
hypertension. It is highly unlikely that sound medical
reasoning can explain this high degree of non-compliance
among prescribing physicians. One possible cause is the
existing controversy within the medical community regarding
the appropriateness of thiazides as a ﬁrst-line medication.
Marketing of more expensive antihypertensives by pharma-
ceutical companies is likely to be an important factor [13].
Also, we cannot rule out the possibility of having included
some patients who are not covered by the new regulation, e.g.,
patients with cardiovascular diseases who did not have their
diagnosis coded in the medical record.
Restricting the number of drugs that are reimbursed is a
widely adopted strategy to contain drug expenses. A major
difference between the Norwegian policy and many analo-
gous programmes is the opportunity that physicians have of
exempting individual patients. Under the Norwegian regu-
lation, the only requirement for reimbursement of other
drugs is a note in the medical record, stating the reason why a
thiazide could not be selected. Stricter conditions for
granting exemptions are common in other settings, for
example the need for approval before prescribing (prior
authorisation) [14]. Limiting access to exemptions might have
increased the effectiveness of the regulation, but would have
entailed greater administrative costs, for example related to
prior-authorisation procedures, and more resistance from
stakeholder groups.
To our knowledge, there are only a very limited number of
rigorous evaluations of the effect of introducing regulatory
measures similar to the one we have carried out. Their
effectiveness is unclear, although prior-authorisation
schemes appear to have a substantial impact on prescribing
[15]. Systematic reviews of the effects of pharmaceutical
policies, including restrictions on reimbursed drugs, are
underway [16].
Another approach to cost-containment for drugs is various
forms of pricing policies. A recent systematic review included
ten studies of the effect of reference pricing, i.e., a maximum
level of reimbursement for a group of drugs assumed to be
therapeutically equivalent [17]. The reviewers concluded that
reference pricing can lead to a ‘‘shift in drug use towards less
expensive drugs.’’ However, in a reference-pricing pro-
gramme, the affected drugs typically belong to one drug
class, e.g., ACE inhibitors. None of the included studies
involved the use of a reference price for the full range of
drugs used to treat a particular condition, thus making it
difﬁcult to compare the effects of reference pricing with the
regulation that we have evaluated.
Conclusions
There was a large increase in the use of thiazides for newly
treated hypertension after a reimbursement rule was put into
effect mandating the use of thiazides if there were no medical
reasons for selecting other drugs. This increase occurred
without monitoring adherence and without introducing
penalties for non-adherence, and no changes were observed
in the proportion of patients who achieved treatment goals
or who were prescribed a second antihypertensive drug.
Figure 5. Proportion of Thiazide Prescriptions among Practices from
Intervention Group in Earlier Trial (Group 1) and Other Practices (Group 2)
doi:10.1371/journal.pmed.0040232.g005
Table 4. Total Sales of Thiazides (ATC Codes C03A and C03E) in Oslo and All of Norway
Region Time Period Absolute
Difference
Relative
Difference (%) 1 January 2003–30 November 2003 1 March 2004–31 January 2005
Oslo (DDD/1,000 inhabitants/day)
a 8.5 10.5 2.0 24
Norway (DDD/1,000 inhabitants/day)
a 10.6 13.9 3.3 31
Source: Norwegian Institute of Public Health.
aThe DDD is the assumed average maintenance dose per day for a drug used on its main indication in adults [1].
doi:10.1371/journal.pmed.0040232.t004
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Background. High blood pressure (hypertension) is a common medical
condition, especially among elderly people. It has no obvious symptoms
but can lead to heart attacks, heart failure, strokes, or kidney failure. It is
diagnosed by measuring blood pressure—the force that blood moving
around the body exerts on the inside of arteries (large blood vessels).
Many factors affect blood pressure (which depends on the amount of
blood being pumped round the body and on the size and condition of
the arteries), but overweight people and individuals who eat fatty or
salty food are at high risk of developing hypertension. Mild hypertension
can often be corrected by making lifestyle changes, but many patients
also take one or more antihypertensive agents. These include thiazide
diuretics and several types of non-thiazide drugs, many of which reduce
heart rate or contractility and/or dilate blood vessels.
Why Was This Study Done? Antihypertensive agents are a major part of
national drug expenditure in developed countries, where as many as one
person in ten is treated for hypertension. The different classes of drugs
are all effective, but their cost varies widely. Thiazides, for example, are a
tenth of the price of many non-thiazide drugs. In Norway, the low use of
thiazides recently led the government to impose a new reimbursement
rule aimed at reducing public expenditure on antihypertensive drugs.
Since March 2004, family doctors have been reimbursed for drug costs
only if they prescribe thiazides as first-line therapy for uncomplicated
hypertension, unless there are medical reasons for selecting other drugs.
Adherence to the rule has not been monitored, and there is no penalty
for non-adherence, so has this intervention changed prescribing
practices? To find out, the researchers in this study analyzed Norwegian
prescribing data before and after the new rule came into effect.
What Did the Researchers Do and Find? The researchers analyzed the
monthly antihypertensive drug–prescribing records of 61 practices
around Oslo, Norway, between January 2003 and November 2003 (pre-
intervention period), between December 2003 and February 2004
(transition period), and between March 2004 and January 2005 (post-
intervention period). This type of study is called an ‘‘interrupted time
series’’. During the pre-intervention period, one in ten patients starting
antihypertensive medication was prescribed a thiazide drug. This
proportion gradually increased during the transition period before
stabilizing at one in four patients throughout the post-intervention
period. A slightly higher proportion of patients reached their recom-
mended blood-pressure goal after the rule was introduced than before,
and a slightly lower proportion needed to switch to a second drug class,
but both these small differences may have been due to chance. Finally,
the researchers estimated that the observed change in prescribing
practices reduced drug costs per Norwegian by US$0.16 (E0.13) in the
first year.
What Do These Findings Mean? Past attempts to change antihyper-
tensive-prescribing practices by trying to influence family doctors (for
example, through education) have largely failed. By contrast, these
findings suggest that imposing a change on them (in this case, by
introducing a new reimbursement rule) can be effective (at least over the
short term and in the practices included in the study), even when
compliance with the change is not monitored nor noncompliance
penalized. However, despite a large shift towards prescribing thiazides,
three-quarters of patients were still prescribed non-thiazide drugs
(possibly because of doubts about the efficacy of thiazides as first-line
drugs), which emphasizes how hard it is to change doctors’ prescribing
habits. Further studies are needed to investigate whether the approach
examined in this study can effectively contain the costs of antihyper-
tensive drugs (and of drugs used for other common medical conditions)
in the long term and in other settings. Also, because the estimated
reduction in drug costs produced by the intervention was relatively
modest (although likely to increase over time as more patients start on
thiazides), other ways to change prescribing practices and produce
savings in national drug expenditures should be investigated.
Additional Information. Please access these Web sites via the online
version of this summary at http://dx.doi.org/10.1371/journal.pmed.
0040232.
 MedlinePlus encyclopedia page on hypertension (in English and
Spanish)
 UK National Institute for Health and Clinical Excellence information on
hypertension for patients, carers, and professionals
 American Heart Association information for patients on high blood
pressure
 An open-access research article describing the potential savings of
using thiazides as the first-choice antihypertensive drug
 A previous study in Norway, published in PLoS Medicine, examined
what happened when doctors were actively encouraged to make
more use of thiazides. There was also an economic evaluation of what
this achieved
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